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Cameron’s letter: European views on the UK’s 
renegotiation
On 10 November, David Cameron formally sent a letter to the President 
of the European Council, Donald Tusk, outlining his aims for the 
planned renegotiation of the UK’s EU membership. The success or 
failure of the renegotiation will depend to a large extent on how the 
other 27 EU member states respond to his proposals. But how do 
countries across the EU view the process? Building on a report
published in 2014 by the German Council on Foreign Relations, 
EUROPP is running a series of overviews of the renegotiation from 
each of the EU’s member states. Compiled by the LSE’s Tim Oliver and 
written by authors based at universities and research institutions, the 
overviews set out what discussion – if any – there has been about the 
renegotiation and the wider views within each country on the 
renegotiation and a potential Brexit. This post compiles all of the 
responses in the series, with a final view from Germany, Greece, 
Slovakia and the EU institutions to be published on 11 November.
• Austria: After Brexit and Grexit, could Auxit be next?
• Belgium: The Belgian view is that European challenges can 
only be tackled through deepening European integration
• Bulgaria: Brexit has been overshadowed by Ukraine, Grexit 
and the refugee crisis
• Croatia: Zagreb sympathises with the UK’s positions, but 
sees few short-term gains from a renegotiation
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• Cyprus: Special ties with the UK will determine Cyprus’s 
final stance
• Czech Republic: A desire to accommodate British demands, 
but without treaty changes
• Denmark: The Danish government is a firm supporter of UK 
demands, albeit with some caveats
• Estonia: Brexit would be contrary to Estonia’s interests
• Finland: Supportive, but a wait-and-see approach
• France: The French are looking for a fair deal for France and 
the EU, not just Britain
• Hungary: A natural supporter for Cameron, but with caveats
• Ireland: Brexit is a matter of significant and growing concern 
in Ireland
• Italy: A Brexit would create a dangerous political precedent 
for Italy
• Latvia: National security, not EU reform, is the priority
• Lithuania: Britain is threatening the EU’s fundamental 
principles
• Luxembourg: There is no enthusiasm in Luxembourg for 
treaty change
• Malta: Should Brexit materialise, UK influence in Malta is 
likely to diminish
• Netherlands: There is support for the UK’s renegotiation, but 
only up to a point
• Poland: Warsaw’s stance remains uncertain
• Portugal: Lisbon’s attitude has been fairly positive to the 
renegotiation, but without support for Treaty changes
• Romania: There is staunch opposition to restrictions on the 
free movement of people
• Slovenia: The government believes the EU’s four freedoms 
should remain the basis for any change
• Spain: A flexible but Europeanist Response
• Sweden: Both risks and opportunities in EU renegotiation
Austria: After Brexit and Grexit, could Auxit be next?
Austria’s media and consequently its public has paid 
much more attention to the consequences of a potential 
Grexit than to the consequences of a Brexit or Britain’s 
attempt at a renegotiation of its EU membership. Whilst 
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Austria is a Eurozone member and it is therefore only 
natural to be interested in the fate of the euro and Greece, the relatively 
limited public interest in the prospect of the UK leaving the EU is 
worrying.
Most references to a Brexit or renegotiation have thus far been linked to 
the implications for Britain, instead of for Austria or for the EU as a 
whole. The underlying premise is that Britain’s problems with the EU are 
a British problem and the British government and people should deal 
with them. The coming Brexit referendum has already strengthened the 
Eurosceptic camp in Austria, and a renegotiation of Britain’s EU 
membership terms or an exit from the EU will reinforce them even more.
A petition in Austria demanding an ‘Auxit’ referendum succeeded in 
collecting as many as 261,159 signatures (4.12 per cent of the 
electorate) in only one week (the week beginning 24 June 2015). This 
may not be a huge number, but compared to a similar petition in 2000
the current petition scored 67,258 signatures more and surprised many. 
Furthermore, the formal threshold of 100,000 signatures was crossed, 
which means that the Austrian parliament is obliged to discuss the 
matter in a plenary session.
The petition outcome is not binding. Given that it was not organised or 
supported by a particular political party, the likelihood that the 
parliament will adopt the call for a referendum is essentially nil. 
Nevertheless, this is yet another indication that Euroscepticism in 
Austria is growing not only in public opinion polls, but also in terms of 
actual political power.
A successful Brexit would be butter on the bread of the far-right 
Freedom Party (FPÖ). The latter is not demanding a complete 
withdrawal from the EU, but its current leader (H. C. Strache) is inspired 
by David Cameron’s stance and is supporting the idea of a re-
negotiation of Austria’s memberships terms. Other parties in Austria 
therefore view the idea of a UK renegotiation of its membership with 
some trepidation, seeing in it the opening of a Pandora’s box of 
problems that could fuel support in Austria for a similar deal or Auxit.
The prospects of Brexit, Grexit and even Auxit, in addition to 
comparable developments elsewhere in Europe (e.g. Iceland revoking 
its EU membership application, or Switzerland restricting the number of 
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EU citizens in its territory), can be interpreted as a sign of the declining 
attractiveness of EU membership. Austria may be still a long way from 
formally turning its back to the EU, but it seems that the UK’s push for a 
renegotiation and forthcoming in/out referendum have helped Austria 
take a small step in that direction. More are likely to follow if Britain’s 
threat to abandon the EU bears fruit.
Emmanuel Sigalas – Vienna Institute for Advanced Studies
Dr Emmanuel Sigalas is Associate Research Fellow at the Vienna 
Institute for Advanced Studies and at the Czech Institute of International 
Relations.
_________________________________
Belgium: The Belgian view is that European 
challenges can only be tackled through deepening 
European integration
Aside from crises such as that over Greece’s place in 
the Eurozone or the ongoing refugee situation, European subjects do no 
attract much public attention in Belgium. It is therefore not surprising 
that the negotiations between the UK and the rest of the EU have not 
been particularly salient in media and public debates.
This is not helped by the secrecy surrounding British demands. What is 
known of the reforms demanded by the British government remain 
vague: no domination of the EU by the Eurozone, an opt-out from “ever 
closer union”, an increased role for national parliaments, less “red tape” 
for businesses, more free trade with the rest of the world, and changes 
to in-work benefits for EU migrants in the UK.
When Charles Michel, the Belgian Prime Minister, met David Cameron 
in June, he admitted that the latter had explained his position and 
strategy but did not want to unveil it fully. This is of course part of the 
negotiation game: to keep one’s position secret while trying to detect the 
other’s. This also explains the reluctance by the governments of many 
member states – with Belgium as no exception – to respond to 
questions about UK demands.
This being said, the UK position seems to have been welcomed, albeit 
with some scepticism, by the Belgian government. If the Belgian Prime 
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Minister showed a clear willingness to listen to Cameron during his tour 
of European capitals, he nonetheless expressed important reservations 
concerning the renegotiation process. While he agreed that the EU 
should be reformed to become more competitive and efficient, to fight 
against social dumping and create growth and jobs, he insisted that 
these negotiations should not end up dismantling Europe.
The “red lines” for the Belgian government are therefore that the core 
European principles of free movement and non-discrimination should be 
untouched and that there should be no veto powers granted to national 
parliaments, since this would amount to institutional gridlock for the 
European Union. Charles Michel also warned that the British could not 
seek a deal where the UK has only the advantages of belonging to the 
EU while leaving the inconvenient aspects for others.
It should be noted here that during the European Council on 25-26 
June, the Belgian Prime Minister was the only one to respond to David 
Cameron’s comment on his referendum project. He highlighted the 
importance of involving all member states and the European 
commission in this project, in order to avoid Britain trying to present a 
“fait accompli” at the December European summit based on limited 
discussions with only a few member states.
All these statements are consistent with a widespread view in Belgium, 
particularly within the Liberal party led government, that numerous 
current challenges for Europeans can be tackled only if one deepens 
European integration. From that perspective, the Belgian foreign affairs 
Minister Didier Reynders even defends the necessity to push for 
European federalism, particularly within the Eurozone. This does not 
necessarily present an obstacle to Britain’s desire to distance itself from 
some of the EU’s policies and institutions. Other member states such as 
Germany or France have also indicated they may be willing to 
accommodate some of Britain’s demands while at the same time 
strengthening the governance of the Eurozone.
One of the reasons why the federalist approach, still very much present 
in Belgian politics, is not at odds with all of Britain’s desired reforms is 
that some of them are ideologically attuned to the liberal-conservative 
agenda of the current Belgian government. More specifically, the 
willingness to cut “red tape”, strengthen the single market or increase 
trade agreements with the rest of the world is not only very compatible 
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with some current EU policies (the agenda for “better regulation” for 
instance or the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
negotiations). It is also very much supported by most right wing political 
groups.
Yet, the Belgian government is a coalition of liberals, social Christians 
and Flemish nationalists, whose political agreement involves similar 
objectives. It might be useful to note here that these demands are the 
ones that trigger the most support elsewhere in the EU. Nevertheless, 
there are internal divisions within the Belgian government on the issue 
of migration and non-discrimination. Indeed, Bart de Wever, the leader 
of the Flemish nationalist Party NVA (belonging to the same “European 
Conservatives and Reformists” group as the Conservative Party inside 
the European Parliament) has supported the British demand for tough 
national limitations on migrations within the EU.
Some of these divisions might indicate that the issue of “Brexit” is not 
only one that can be understood along national lines, but is an issue 
that also requires an analysis of ideological convergences and 
divergences both within and across member states. This is all the more 
important since the supranational institutions which could be involved in 
designing the reforms wanted by Britain’s Conservatives are 
characterised by ideological as much as national opposition.
Sophie Heine – Royal Institute for International Relations
Dr Sophie Heine is a Senior Research Fellow at Egmont, the Royal 
Institute for International Relations, Brussels.
_________________________________
Bulgaria: Brexit has been overshadowed by Ukraine, 
Grexit and the refugee crisis
The Conservative party’s May 2015 election victory has 
put real flesh on David Cameron’s January 2013 pledge 
to hold a referendum on the UK’s EU membership. Despite this, 
Cameron’s pledge resulted in more public debate and media reporting 
in Bulgaria than the 2015 election result. Brexit has been overshadowed 
by the Ukrainian crisis, Russia’s geopolitical game around the South 
Stream pipeline project, the potential danger of a Grexit, and last but not 
least the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean.
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It is important to note two further things about UK-Bulgarian relations. 
First, anti-EU attitudes remain marginal in Bulgaria and go hand in hand 
with pro-Russia and pro-Putin sentiments. This means any affinity 
between Bulgarian and British Euroscepticism is extremely difficult. 
Second, given that British renegotiation demands are still vague and in 
a state of development, there are no explicit Bulgarian views on them 
except the view that they should be accommodated without treaty 
changes.
There have been two most relevant high-level contacts on Britain’s EU 
reform agenda. The first was a meeting in January 2015 between the 
UK Foreign Secretary and Bulgaria’s Foreign Minister. The second time 
Philip Hammond and Daniel Mitov met was in London in June 2015. 
The first meeting led to the impression that UK concerns about “benefit 
tourism” had the potential to cause tensions with Bulgaria. Yet the 
meeting also led to Minister Mitov’s public statement: “I cannot imagine 
a European Union without the United Kingdom”. In their joint June 
statement the two ministers demonstrated general agreement on 
virtually all relevant issues on the UK’s EU reform agenda.
One of the UK’s biggest concerns – migration – is reported to have 
been discussed with mutual understanding for the rather different 
concerns on both sides. The UK made clear its concerns about abuse of 
the UK’s welfare system, while Bulgaria made clear that – like other EU 
member states – the freedom of movement of people to work is a “red 
line”.
The two ministers agreed “on the need to develop an EU that is more 
competitive, democratically accountable and fair to all member states, 
whether part of the euro or not”. Both the UK (with its opt-outs) and 
Bulgaria (not yet part of the Eurozone) have common concerns. 
Bulgaria can therefore be expected to favour any safeguards that 
guarantee it will not become subject to economic policy decisions 
without being involved in or informed about the decision making 
process.
Last but not least, the two ministers expressed their governments’ 
commitment to complete the Single Market in services (including 
financial services), digital and energy; to reduce the regulatory burden 
on business, especially Small and Medium sized Enterprises; to finalise 
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ambitious Free Trade Agreements, including the EU-US Free Trade 
Agreement, and to communicate its benefits.
Finally, Bulgaria and Estonia are due to chair the EU’s presidency in 
2018, with them forming party of the EU’s Troika Presidency in 2017. 
The UK’s Foreign Office has given its Bulgarian and Estonian partners 
assurances that the UK’s involvement will not be affected by the 
referendum (due by early 2017), whatever the outcome might be. There 
are no opinion polls on what Bulgarians believe the outcome of the UK’s 
referendum will be, but it is likely a majority of Bulgarians would back 
continued British EU membership.
Antoinette Primatarova – Center for Liberal Strategies, Sofia
Antoinette Primatarova is Director of the European program of the 
Center for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgaria.
_________________________________
Croatia: Zagreb sympathises with the UK’s positions, but sees few 
short-term gains from a renegotiation
In what is an election year in Croatia, very few topics not 
directly linked to local affairs have made their way into 
the mainstream public debate. Migration has slowly 
generated more interest due to the magnitude of the 
problem and the geographic location of Croatia, but the 
reforms to the EU that the British government has proposed have 
received limited attention.
Elections aside, another reason why more attention is not paid to these 
proposals is that they are rather vague and do not press Croatia to 
come up with clear positions. There is also a sense that whatever 
Croatia says, the crucial negotiations will be carried out by the big EU 
members and states mostly concerned with a possible Brexit. A June 
2015 report by Global Counsel on the impact of a Brexit on EU member 
states placed Croatia in the least affected group of countries.
The European Affairs and the Foreign Affairs committees of the 
Croatian parliament, however, have discussed British proposals, 
although they have not reached any conclusions on the issue. The 
general impression from these debates, however, is that Croatia would 
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support the strengthening of the role of national parliaments in EU policy 
making. Croatia is already one of a few member states where national 
parliaments enjoy substantial rights in this area.
David Cameron can also count on some support from Croatian Prime 
Minister Milanović. The Croatian PM has expressed understanding that 
too much bureaucracy is stifling the Union’s competitiveness and 
favours cutting red tape and curbing the extension of powers of the 
Commission. Moreover, any negotiating of Eurozone safeguards for 
countries outside the euro area, Croatia being one of them, will be 
closely followed.
With respect to the influx of EU nationals seeking employment in the UK 
and the broader debate on migration, Milanović revealed genuine 
empathy for the situation the British government faces. Yet, the UK is 
one of five EU member states which in June 2015 decided to keep 
restrictions on the free mobility of Croatian workers for another three 
years. Thus, British attempts to change in-work benefits for EU workers 
in the UK do not, in the short run, affect Croatian citizens and are not a 
direct concern for the current government. However, the free movement 
of people is taken as one of the fundamental principles of the EU that 
needs to be protected and maintained.
The bottom line for Croatia is that there should be no treaty change, or 
at least there should be no opening up of the treaty framework which 
does not deliver comprehensive and better outcomes for all member 
states. A statement which allows for voluntary participation or individual 
adaptation to ‘ever closer union’ would probably be supported by 
Croatia, but unpacking the treaty framework seems too risky. As the 
newest member to succeed in joining the EU after extensive and 
arduous negotiations, Croatia would prefer to see compromise reached 
and the unity of the Union maintained rather than Britain leaving.
Senada Šelo Šabić – Institute for Development and International 
Relations
Dr Senada Šelo Šabić is a researcher at the Institute for Development 
and International Relations, Zagreb.
___________________________________
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Cyprus: Special ties with the UK will determine Cyprus’s final 
stance 
Cypriot news has been dominated by the revival of the 
‘Cyprus Problem’ and negotiations aiming for a 
reunification of the island, the Cypriot government’s 
struggle to lead the economy to recovery and Greece’s 
financial saga. Consequently, the UK’s rather 
unorthodox approach in renegotiating certain aspects of its EU 
membership has not yet sparked any substantial interest. Nevertheless, 
Cyprus and the UK have a long-standing special relationship and it is 
this relationship that will largely shape the government’s final response 
when substantial negotiations get underway.
Cyprus is a former British colony and since the declaration of its 
independence in 1960, the UK has retained two military bases on the 
island and is also one of three countries responsible for guaranteeing its 
independence. Over the past decades, the two countries have 
developed multi-faceted relations that include political, economic, 
commercial, cultural and educational links. These relations were further 
strengthened following Cyprus’ EU entry and its participation in the 
Single Market, with the UK being one of the three strongest trading 
partners for Cyprus. Indicatively, between 2009 and 2013, domestic 
exports to the UK more than doubled (above 6% of total exports) while 
the percentage of the services both exported and imported between 
Cyprus and the UK is around 20% for Cyprus. Additionally, more than 
250,000 Cypriots live and study in the UK, tens of thousands of Britons 
live as permanent residents in Cyprus, and around a million UK tourists 
visit the island each year.
Given these deeply entrenched ties, the Cypriot government will not 
seek in any way to jeopardize British EU membership through its stance 
in the renegotiation process. As expected, this was reflected in a recent 
meeting between the Cypriot president Anastasiades and prime minister 
Cameron on 18 September 2015. A Downing Street press release 
stressed that President Anastasiades, “expressed his support for the 
UK’s reform agenda, in particular the emphasis on greater 
competitiveness and a stronger role for national Parliaments”.
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Even though the UK has not yet put forward specific demands for 
renegotiation, one can outline in general terms what these will be and, 
in turn, what the possible Cypriot responses might be.
Making the EU more competitive, cutting red tape and further 
liberalising the single market: Like the UK, Cyprus relies heavily on the 
financial services sector and, therefore, the two countries support 
further liberalisation and the elimination of all possible barriers in this 
sector of the EU’s single market.
Upgrading the role of national parliaments: Cyprus will most likely favour 
proposals that could possibly tackle the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU. 
This could be achieved by strengthening the role of national parliaments 
in the EU’s decision-making processes, introducing for example a 
revised yellow-card system where national parliaments would have a 
more decisive role in influencing legislative proposals discussed at the 
European level.
Revising the European Treaties: Cyprus would probably align with other 
EU countries in arguing that there would be no beneficial effects from a 
revision of the European Treaties at this point in time. However, Cyprus 
would be expected to accommodate UK demands for an ‘opt-out’ on the 
phrase ‘ever closer union’ given that this would not have repercussions 
on other states.
Curbing social benefits to EU citizens in the UK: The Government of 
Cyprus is very sensitive when it comes to the application of the EU’s 
basic freedoms. Agreeing to any sort of restriction to the free movement 
of people within the EU could create precedence with a possible 
negative effect for the ongoing peace talks over the ‘Cyprus Problem’. 
The Cypriot government is likely to acknowledge the problems caused 
by abusers of the current social welfare systems in European countries 
and would consent to proposals that specifically tackle any such 
problematic cases. However, under no circumstances would the Cypriot 
government accept any derogation regarding the basic freedoms 
applicable within the EU.
In light of the above, one should therefore expect Cyprus to take a 
moderate and constructive stance on the British renegotiation with a 
view of not jeopardising the UK’s EU membership.
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Adonis Pegasiou – University of Cyprus
Adonis Pegasiou is an Adjunct Lecturer at the University of Cyprus and 
a Research Fellow at the European University Cyprus.
___________________________________
Czech Republic: A desire to accommodate British demands, but 
without treaty changes
Britain’s attempt to renegotiate its EU membership has 
received little political and public attention in the Czech 
Republic. As in other Central European states, debate 
has been dominated by the ongoing migration crisis and 
the fight against the EU’s resettlement quotas. So far no 
Czech political leader has commented on the British demands and the 
Czech government has not adopted any position for the negotiations.
It is, however, clear that the Czech Republic strongly supports keeping 
the UK inside the EU. Britain has long been considered a natural ally in 
several policy areas. It strongly supports the single market, liberalisation 
of trade, a strong transatlantic partnership and the positions of both 
countries on other foreign policy issues are traditionally very similar. It is 
a shared opinion amongst Czech political leaders that a Brexit would 
harm the EU as well as Czech interests.
Hence we can expect that the Czech Republic will pursue solutions that 
will accommodate British demands. However, this will need to be 
achieved without comprising the basic foundations of the European 
integration project. Czechs will definitely support British demands for 
enhancing the single market, especially in the area of services, the 
digital market, and energy, as these are also priorities for the Czech 
government. The Czech Republic has always promoted elimination of 
trade barriers, thus the government will support British any demands for 
a quick completion of trade deals with the US and other big economies.
The Czech government is hesitant to support British demands that 
would require change of the EU’s treaty. The Czech government’s 
recently adopted EU strategy took a negative view towards treaty 
changes. In line with this position, the country is unlikely to support a 
British opt–out from “ever closer union” if this is pursued as a treaty 
Page 12 of 49EUROPP – Cameron’s letter: European views on the UK’s renegotiation
12/11/2015http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/11/10/camerons-letter-european-view...
change. Support for such a British opt–out would undermine long-term 
Czech efforts to preserve and foster the EU’s unity.
Similarly, like most of the other EU countries, and especially those who 
joined the EU in the last decade, the country will be strongly against any 
measures that would discriminate against citizens of other EU member 
states. The EU’s four freedoms, and especially the freedom of 
movement of people, are considered untouchable. This of course 
doesn’t mean that the Czech Government is opposed to debate on how 
to tackle abuses of this freedom. Taking into consideration the relatively 
small number of Czechs living and working in the UK (around 40,000), 
the government will probably leave the fight for freedom of movement of 
people to member states such as Poland who have more of an interest 
in this area.
On the other hand, we can expect the Czech Republic to support a 
greater say for national parliaments in EU decision-making, including 
the introduction of the so-called green card system. Again, however, this 
would ideally happen without treaty changes. The Czech government 
also shares British concerns that the Economic and Monetary Union 
policies that effect all the EU Member States should be debated in the 
EU-28 format.
Vladimír Bartovic – EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy
Vladimír Bartovic is director of EUROPEUM Institute for European 
Policy, Prague.
___________________________________
Denmark: The Danish government is a firm 
supporter of UK demands, albeit with some caveats
David Cameron’s presentation of Britain’s renegotiation 
demands at the European Council Meeting in late June 
2015 coincided with a change of government in Denmark. This change 
of government has had significant implications for the Danish stance on 
the UK’s renegotiation of its relationship with the EU. As a result of the 
Danish general elections on 18 June 2015, the centre-left Social 
Democrat/Social Liberal coalition government was replaced by a 
government consisting only of the right-wing Liberal Party. The outgoing 
Prime Minister, the Social Democrat Helle Thorning-Schmidt, 
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represented Denmark at the European Council Meeting, but her ability 
to react to David Cameron’s presentation of the British demands was 
affected by the incoming government’s different line on British 
renegotiation.
The former government wanted to keep the UK in the EU, but stressed 
that Denmark should stay as close as possible to the EU core. It was 
also sceptical towards limiting welfare benefits for workers from other 
EU countries. The new government has no permanent majority across 
policy areas but is kept in power by the support of the Eurosceptic 
Danish People’s Party, the Eurosceptic New Alliance and a much-
reduced Conservative Party, which has become increasingly sceptical 
towards EU integration. The four parties had agreed on a common 
document prior to the 18 June elections which stressed the need to 
restrict the access of EU workers to social benefits in other EU countries 
and that they would, in general terms, support the UK renegotiation.
These elements found their way into the new Liberal government’s 
policy programme issued at the end of June. The Danish Government 
aimed to ensure that “national welfare systems were not undermined by 
EU rules”. The government would “work with like-minded countries in 
order to revise EU rules on welfare benefits for mobile workers as soon 
as possible”. Last but not least, the Danish government would “support 
the British government’s endeavours in order for the UK – one of 
Denmark’s most crucial partners – to remain centrally placed in the EU.”
The post-June Danish government is therefore to be counted as a firm 
supporter of the British demands for renegotiations. In the press release 
just before Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s meeting in Downing 
Street on Monday 21 September, it was stressed that Denmark and the 
UK had many common interests in relation to free-trade, expansion of 
the internal market and a strengthening of member states’ 
competitiveness. It stated that, “we want to work together with the UK 
on modernising EU-legislation on welfare benefits”.
Although it has not been expressed directly, it is conceivable that 
Denmark would be willing to support the UK on elements such as its 
problems with the preamble, protection of rights for non-euro member 
states and a stronger role for national parliaments in some form or 
another. However, there are limits to this Danish support. Denmark 
Page 14 of 49EUROPP – Cameron’s letter: European views on the UK’s renegotiation
12/11/2015http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/11/10/camerons-letter-european-view...
does not want treaty changes. The Danish government still stresses that 
it wants to stay as close as possible to the EU core.
A referendum will take place in December this year on whether 
Denmark should replace its exemption on justice and home affairs with 
an opt-in possibility to take part in legislation on Justice and Home 
Affairs – like the UK’s present arrangement. Denmark – like the UK – 
does not take part in the EU’s asylum policy and will not do so in the 
short term even if it is a yes in December.
The referendum is supported by the traditionally pro-EU parties in the 
Danish Parliament, including the Conservative Party. The present 
Danish government does not want a Danish in-out referendum à la the 
UK and there is no majority in the Danish parliament for such a 
referendum. However, the Danish People’s Party does want a Danish 
referendum like the British one and holds up the British endeavours as 
an example to follow. The British renegotiation has clearly given 
impetus to Danish right-wing Euroscepticism.
Henrik Larsen – University of Copenhagen
Professor Henrik Larsen holds the Jean Monnet Chair in European 
foreign and security integration at the Department of Political Science, 
University of Copenhagen.
_________________________________
Estonia: Brexit would be contrary to Estonia’s interests
Many positive and nice words were exchanged when the 
Estonian prime minister, Taavi Rõivas, and British prime 
minister, David Cameron, met in Downing Street on 9 
October 2015. “Estonia and the UK have a similar 
understanding of the changed security situation – we are 
very close allies in both NATO and the European Union,” Rõivas said.
As far as NATO is concerned Estonia appreciates the UK’s decision to 
send additional troops to the Baltic region and so Rõivas’ words may 
even be true. However, the assertion that Estonia and the UK are also 
very close allies in the EU raises large doubts.
The latest Eurobarometer poll (July 2015) revealed quite clearly how 
very different Estonians and Britons are. Namely, support for the euro 
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was highest in Estonia (83%) and lowest in the UK (20%). In the Baltic 
States, which have all now adopted the euro, support has steadily risen 
despite the Greek crisis.
This is exactly why it is premature to call the UK and Estonia allies in 
the European Union. In the noughties, it was even thought that Estonian 
policy in the EU might be “Britanised” as Estonia pursued a very liberal 
economic policy with a flat tax regime, and stressed the importance of 
the single market. Russia’s aggressive behaviour and the introduction of 
the euro in Estonia in 2011 changed all that. The euro was securitised 
and Estonia moved closer to Germany who played the main role in the 
euro crisis. In addition, Estonia realized more strongly than ever that to 
cope with Russia, the EU must speak with one voice. All these moves 
forced the member states, especially in the Eurozone, to cede more of 
their sovereignty.
Contrary to a closer Union, the UK has always wanted to stop the closer 
integration of Europe. Therefore, the interests of Estonia and the UK in 
the EU differ to a large extent. It is to Estonia’s benefit to see the EU as 
a large and mighty counterweight to Russia. This therefore poses a 
problem for Estonia. A UK departure from the EU would not serve 
Estonian interests, but the two countries do not see eye to eye on how 
the EU should change.
With the UK out of the EU, the very essence and logic of the Union 
would change. It would deny the assumption that the EU is about 
accumulating integration and that the countries in the EU would never 
leave. As Slovakia has threatened to leave the EU due to the refugee 
issue, one might only imagine what kind of domino effect the UK’s 
departure might have. A smaller EU cannot be taken seriously by the 
other world powers, especially in the eyes of Russia, who always sees 
the loss of territory as a sign of weakness.
And finally, although it is a minor detail, the UK departing from the EU 
may have one unexpected consequence for Estonia. During the Cold 
War, beside Russian, Estonia studied mostly English in school. 
Estonians now speak English as their first foreign language. But they 
are not very fluent in either French or German. If the UK leaves the EU, 
the importance and use of English would very likely decrease also 
reducing options for Estonians to apply for jobs in the European 
institutions, as the use of French and German would increase.
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At the same time, Estonia is weary of Britain’s demands for reform as 
the price to keep it within the Union. As in many countries, there is 
support for enhancing the economic competitiveness of the EU, but for 
Estonia this is done with an eye to German – and thus Eurozone – 
positions and aims, not Britain’s. Proposals to limit access to in-work 
benefits for EU migrants raise objections found throughout Eastern and 
Central Europe.
Renegotiations also mean that Estonia, like other member states, may 
have to choose whose side to take – either Britain’s or Germany’s – 
which causes some discomfort for a small country like Estonia. 
Estonian’s remember that when, along with the other Eastern European 
countries, it chose to support the US and the UK over the Iraq war in 
2003 it received a lot of criticism from Germany and France.
Consequently, the UK’s decision to leave the EU would be contrary to 
Estonia’s interests, but finding an agreement to keep Britain inside the 
club will not be easy. The only sensible option for Estonia is to work with 
the other EU countries to keep the UK in the European Union.
Erkki Bahovski – Diplomaatia
Erkki Bahovski is the Editor-in-Chief of Diplomaatia, foreign and security 
policy magazine in Estonia. 
___________________________________ 
Finland: Supportive, but with a wait-and-see approach
Successfully settling the so-called ‘UK Question’ has 
been a pivotal issue in Helsinki for quite some time, yet 
multiple ongoing European crises have largely hijacked 
much of the Finnish EU agenda. The continuing 
ambiguity over the UK’s renegotiation, and relatedly, a 
difficulty of seeing a meaningful Finnish contribution to the process has 
resulted in a prolonged wait-and-see approach in Helsinki.
The most interesting development in addressing the UK question in 
Helsinki is a domestic one. The inclusion of the openly populist and 
Eurosceptic Finns Party in the current Finnish government along with 
the two major centre-right and pro-European parties in June 2015, has 
been noted also in the UK as it could potentially bring Finland closer to 
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the UK in EU affairs. Over the past few years strong links have grown 
between the Finns Party and the UK Conservative Party.
The minister for foreign affairs, Mr. Timo Soini, has recently restated his 
support for Cameron’s EU renegotiation and referendum plan by saying 
it is ‘an absolutely great idea’. However, he also noted that the UK 
cannot expect Finland to be a ‘100 per cent supporter at every stage’, 
and that his hands are tied by the Finnish government’s positions.
The current government’s programme stipulates that Finland does not 
support EU Treaty reform. As David Cameron now seems to have 
dropped the idea of pushing for an immediate EU Treaty change, Finns 
are likely to find it easier to address the UK’s demands in general. 
Indeed, the minister of finance, Alexander Stubb, has suggested that 
the UK’s demands for economic reforms, enhanced role for national 
parliaments, and limitations on benefits for migrant workers are justified.
Traditionally, Finland and the UK have been on the same page in 
developing the single market and advancing the EU’s external trade. 
Cutting red tape and improving the EU’s competitiveness should 
therefore not be a problem for Helsinki. Some difficulties can however 
emerge in other fields. First, the UK might need to work harder to 
explain the rationale for UK opt-outs from the EU Treaty’s objective to 
move towards an ‘ever closer union’, especially considering that it is not 
part of the Eurozone and has opted out of Schengen.
If this demand is connected to David Cameron’s objective to obtain 
‘safeguards’ against potentially converging interests of the Eurozone 
countries, Finns are likely to be concerned about potential further 
complexities and inefficiencies in the EU’s institutional structures. 
Second, and although Finland is a strong supporter of enhancing the 
role of national parliaments in the EU’s decision-making, it has also 
called for clarity between the two levels of parliamentary scrutiny in the 
EU’s decision-making (i.e. the EU and national).
Moreover, it has emphasized that its parliament has a strong and robust 
role in EU affairs and urged others to follow suit. Finally, while the aim to 
limit EU citizens’ access to work related benefits and social security in 
other EU member states might find some support in Finland, UK 
negotiators are likely to be reminded that these issues should be 
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resolved through EU law-making processes, and that any such 
demands should not undermine the principle of non-discrimination.
The most significant obstacle that Finnish decision-makers and 
observers face vis-à-vis the UK’s agenda, however, relates to the fact 
that the UK has not yet clarified in detail its renegotiation demands. It is 
therefore difficult to openly discuss in Helsinki what would be acceptable 
for Finland, or indeed how Finland could actually contribute to the 
process. The UK demands will certainly be put under close scrutiny in 
Helsinki, yet they are equally likely to be approached constructively. As 
minister Stubb put it: ‘I believe without the UK there is no EU’.
Juha Jokela – Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Juha Kokela is program director of the European Union research 
program at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki. This 
view is based on his contribution to the CERI and Robert Schuman 
Foundation’s report ‘Brexit: what Fair Deal between the UK and EU 
member States?’ 
___________________________________
France: The French are looking for a fair deal for 
France and the EU, not just for Britain
France has been ambivalent on the British renegotiation 
campaign. The general mood is to keep the UK in, but 
messages are going in different directions. Some are shrugging off the 
UK’s calls for reform and are not trying very hard to accommodate 
Westminster. Others seem keener to find an acceptable deal for Britain.
George Osborne’s visit to Paris in late July illustrates this situation. He 
got a cold shoulder from Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, not much 
more from Finance Minister Michel Sapin, and a warmer welcome from 
Economy Minister Emmanuel Macron. Meanwhile, François Hollande’s 
meeting with David Cameron a few days ago could be summed up as: 
“we are ready to discuss, but give us a list of reforms we can actually 
talk about”.
Yet, it seems that Emmanuel Macron has swayed the debate on the UK 
renegotiation so that it should be incorporated in the broader 
discussions on the EMU reforms. France has indeed started to work on 
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proposals to reform the Eurozone and an institutional debate is likely to 
start after the French presidential and German general elections in 
2017. The feasibility of this balance between the French plans for the 
EMU – still inchoate – and the UK plans – still fuzzy – remains evidently 
unclear though.
France is generally perceived as one of the potential hardliners in the 
renegotiations. But French diplomacy is attempting to quell this view. To 
some extent, it is indeed exaggerated, but France has some clear red 
lines. The two countries could find common ground on the need to 
recalibrate EU regulation and promote competitiveness. The French 
support the European Commission’s Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance programme (REFIT) and have tried to upload the “choc de 
simplification” at the EU level, in particular to ease up the regulatory 
burden over SMEs. They, however, oppose any attempt to water down 
legislation on social and consumers’ rights.
France would be amenable to finding a deal to ‘protect the integrity of 
the single market’ as long as it is not legally binding and would not 
impede on the developments of the Eurozone. That, however, clearly 
falls below the UK’s expectations. Changing in-work benefits for EU 
migrants is also a touchy issue. If ECJ rulings can alter the jurisdiction, 
France will welcome this development, because any adjustment to the 
primary or secondary law on this point will likely be quashed. In a way, 
France is telling Britain to change its system, not the EU’s.
The role of national parliaments and granting an opt-out of the ‘ever 
closer union’ do not trigger vivid debates. The whole British debate on 
‘ever closer union’ is mind-numbing for the French. That being said, 
some realise an opt-out could cause legal problems. This reference has 
repeatedly been used by the ECJ in its rulings and the implications of a 
British opt-out could be greater than imagined on the surface of the 
debate.
Lastly, the role of national parliaments leaves the French quite 
indifferent. Two reasons justify this position. First, the French Parliament 
(the Assemblée Nationale and the Sénat) are secondary actors in 
French EU politics compared to the government and the President. 
Second, the priority is to streamline the scrutiny process more than to 
explore legal ways to implement a green or red card system. The 
French Senate has supported the non-legally-binding first ‘green card’ 
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launched by the House of Lords on food waste, but the French 
government is unlikely to echo a call for additional parliamentary 
powers.
France wants the UK to remain within the EU and to quote Jean-Claude 
Juncker will strive to find a ‘fair deal’. However that deal will have to be 
fair for Britain but most importantly for France, and more broadly the 
EU.
Vivien Pertusot – French Institute of International Relations (IFRI)
Vivien Pertusot is the head of the Brussels office of the Institut Francais 
des Relations Internationales.
_________________________________
Hungary: A natural supporter for Cameron, but with caveats
Hungary is a medium sized member state in the EU, with 
a geographical position, allies, partners, and priorities in 
the European agenda that are often fundamentally 
different from those of the UK. Despite these differences, 
over the past four years Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has 
been seen as David Cameron’s natural partner and supporter on some 
major EU Council decisions.
The two leaders were often mentioned together after the negotiations of 
the European Fiscal Compact in 2012, and there was some confusion 
on the night when the pact was announced with some reports indicating 
that Hungary was to side with the UK and remain outside of the 
agreement. Orbán and Cameron also shared a common position during 
the election process of the new President of the Commission, Jean-
Claude Juncker. Both prime ministers were against Junker’s nomination 
and against the strengthening of the role of the European Parliament at 
the expense of the European Council.
Viktor Orbán was elected Hungary’s prime minister with a two-third 
majority in 2010 and his party FIDESZ managed to repeat its victory for 
a second term with another two-third majority in 2014. This previously 
unprecedented parliamentary position was used to centralise the party’s 
power, change the country’s constitution, and fundamentally transform 
the economy.
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After a strong and generally well-received European Council presidency 
in 2011, a series of constitutional, political and economic decisions (for 
example, changes to the banking tax and the energy market) led to 
tensions between the EU and Hungary, with several spectacular 
clashes in the European Parliament. Many even describe the 
government of Hungary as one of the most Eurosceptic governments 
currently in the EU.
Although political and economic relations with Britain are in good shape, 
Germany and Austria are Hungary’s most important foreign trade 
partners and political allies in the EU, so any decision over the UK’s 
renegotiation will take into careful account the position of these Member 
States. On a whole, though, Hungary strongly supports British 
membership in the EU. A Brexit would fundamentally change the 
geometry of EU voting, which would eventually cause mid-sized 
countries to lose some influence.
Cameron’s hard opposition to ‘even closer union’ sits well with the anti-
federal rhetoric of the Hungarian government. The summary of the 2011 
EU presidency priorities of Hungary claimed that Hungary was 
committed to the community method, which should take precedence 
over intergovernmental decision-making. It stated that, ‘Crisis situations 
could lead to the temporary strengthening of intergovernmentalism 
which can only be accepted if a return to decision-making within the 
framework of the Treaty is possible in the short run.’
Despite this, by 2013, Mr Orbán’s rhetoric had shifted strongly towards 
intergovernmentalism. He made clear that “Hungary pursues a policy of 
balance and does not approve of national competences being converted 
‘on the sly’ into community-level competences in the EU”. He went on to 
argue that “there are more and more new proposals to disturb the 
balance between national and community competences and this is 
unacceptable”. Therefore, Hungary would welcome reform proposals 
that would shift the institutional balance within the EU, for example by 
moving the Commission away from the Parliament and towards the 
Council of Ministers.
No one can expect any major treaty changes in this field since this faces 
strong opposition from France and Germany. But as the Hungarian 
government emphasised recently, Hungary would not currently support 
any major shift towards an even closer economic union. For example, 
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Hungary would resist further tax harmonisation, as it is an advocate of 
competition between tax regimes.
Giving more power to national parliaments would secure the symbolic 
support of Hungary, although it would undermine the current system by 
which national governments represent the national interests in the 
supranational institutions. This trade-off would eventually result in a 
softer position on this reform proposal, although some elements would 
still be supported, for example better scrutinising of matters connected 
to subsidiarity and proportionality.
As the target date for Hungary adopting the Euro slips further, the 
unification of the Eurozone’s economic governance becomes more 
problematic for outsiders such as Hungary because it is evident that the 
future integration of the EU will mainly occur within the Eurozone. 
Because of this, Hungary, like other outsiders, worries that their national 
interests will not be equally represented within the EU. Hungary will 
therefore support Cameron’s aim to introduce more safeguards in this 
area.
Many think that reform proposals regarding competitiveness and 
financial regulations in the EU will be agreed relatively easily, including 
the UK’s aim to extend the single market in services. However, these 
proposals could cause controversies in Hungary. The country’s banking 
tax is the highest in Europe, and the government has shown 
nationalisation tendencies in different sectors of the economy, with 
heavy windfall taxes on some businesses meaning they are in a 
weakened position to compete in the single market.
Cameron’s proposals for a major curb on immigration and free 
movement of labour in the EU, such as through limiting in-work and out-
of-work benefits available to migrants from EU Member States, has 
received a cold reception in the Central and Eastern European Member 
States. In recent years, London has become the fifth biggest Hungarian 
city and the number of Hungarians emigrating to Britain remains high. 
That said, some concessions could be made, especially in the field of 
out-of-work benefits, if the changes related only to Britain.
Finally, questions remain as to how Cameron can achieve reforms 
within the EU. Opening up the treaties would cause problems for 
Hungary, since, to pick one example, the incorporation of further 
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liberalisation of the services market would clash with the centralisation 
tendencies of the government’s economic policy. If treaties are opened 
to a deal over institutional changes surrounding the Eurozone’s 
economic governance, then this could lead to a situation where Hungary 
cannot block a “package decision”.
Summing up, proposing changes – both those UK-specific in character 
and those aimed at the wider EU – that avoid treaty modifications would 
make it easier to secure the support of Hungary’s government and 
parliament.
Zoltán Gálik – Corvinus University of Budapest
Zoltán Gálik is an Associate Professor at Corvinus University of 
Budapest, International Studies Department 
________________________________
Ireland: Brexit is a matter of significant and growing concern in 
Ireland
The prospect of a Brexit and the renegotiation of the United Kingdom’s 
relations with the EU is a matter of significant and growing concern in 
Ireland, having implications not only for UK-EU relations but for Irish-UK 
relations and, in particular, for Northern Ireland.
Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the European Communities on 
the same day in 1973, at a time when relations between the two states 
were near their lowest ebb in a generation. In the four decades since, 
the Anglo-Irish relationship has flourished. Joint membership of the EU 
has provided a forum for contact on diverse policy issues, strengthened 
cross-border ties and institutions, played a significant role in the 
Northern Irish peace process, and fostered deep political and economic 
interdependencies between the two countries. In the context of the UK-
EU negotiations, then, Ireland finds itself between Scylla and Charybdis.
On the one hand, the country remains a committed member of the EU, 
with little in the way of domestic political Euroscepticism, and is deeply 
wary of any attempts by the UK to roll back the process of European 
integration. On the other hand, Ireland is acutely aware that failing to 
secure a reform package to help keep the UK in the EU could have 
profoundly negative implications for the island of Ireland. Indeed, 
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leaving aside the obvious trade and business implications, the debate in 
Ireland is increasingly centring on the impact Brexit could have on 
peace and stability in Northern Ireland.
In the event of a British departure from the EU, Ireland’s border with 
Northern Ireland would become the external border of the European 
Union, potentially with all the associated border controls and security 
checks that this entails. The possible return of barriers dismantled over 
the past generation would be deeply symbolic for Northern Irish 
nationalists, who could once again feel themselves disconnected from 
the Irish state.
It gives some cause for cautious optimism, then, that at least a small 
number of the suggested UK reforms resonate not only with Ireland’s 
priorities, but with those of the European Commission. Completing the 
Single Market in services and the digital sector, for example, is an 
agenda to which Ireland, as a hub for multinationals and a country with 
a burgeoning digital sector, will be empathetic. So too will it be on the 
issues of completing free-trade deals, improving competitiveness and 
relaxing the regulatory burden for business: any advantage for still-
struggling Irish SMEs will be welcome.
Even on the somewhat thornier issue of ‘ever closer union’, Ireland is 
likely to be in favour of a creative accommodation for the UK. After all, 
even a minor concession by the EU on this issue would constitute a 
major, symbolic victory for David Cameron – one that could have a 
particularly profound effect on the result of the British EU referendum. 
Ultimately, though, much will depend on the specifics of the UK’s more 
substantial demands, and the most significant obstacle to Irish support 
is likely to be the UK’s proposed restrictions on the free movement of 
labour.
Considering Ireland’s history of economic migration, UK proposals for 
transitional controls for new Member States, or restrictions on welfare 
provisions for jobseekers (both driven in large part by a toxic domestic 
debate in the UK) are unlikely to be considered positively. Freedom of 
movement, after all, encompasses the freedom to move to seek 
employment.
If the UK were to approach these issues from the perspective of curbing 
specific abuses, such as welfare fraud, it could ultimately gain traction. 
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However, the sine qua non of any such proposal will be to ensure that it 
is not inherently discriminatory against citizens of specific EU Member 
States, current or future.
Overall, then, the Irish view of the negotiations is one characterised by 
caution. There is much on the line for Ireland, but clarity is needed and 
for now the outcome remains deeply uncertain. Indeed, uncertainty and 
complexity have become the hallmarks of the UK’s engagement with the 
EU in recent times, and it is clear that Mr Cameron’s reform agenda has 
engendered a degree of exasperation in several European capitals.
From the Irish point of view, however, the loss of the UK from the EU 
would be so profound in its consequences that facilitating a constructive 
and collaborative dialogue over the coming months will be a priority.
Andrew Gilmore – Institute of International and European Affairs
Andrew Gilmore is Senior Researcher at the Institute of International 
and European Affairs, Dublin.
_________________________________
Italy: A Brexit would create a dangerous political 
precedent for Italy
Pressured by the current migration crisis and the need to 
accelerate growth and employment, Italian political and 
economic stability may be hindered by further British opt outs from the 
EU. From a political point of view, with 1.1 Italians out of three believing 
that Italy would be better off without Europe, a Brexit would create a 
dangerous political precedent.
It would break the Italian government’s taboo over the inadmissibility of 
EU Treaty renegotiations, fostering demands for a tailored membership 
for Italy. To date, half of the parties represented in the Italian Parliament 
have run Eurosceptic campaigns. Among them, the Five Star Movement
and Lega Nord have campaigned on the need for a referendum on the 
euro. If the UK decided to push for further opt outs from the EU then 
current Italian support for European integration would certainly come 
under pressure.
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At the same time, the potential cost of failing to find a compromise with 
the UK does not pass unnoticed. Since 2014, Italian exports to the UK 
have grown 9.4 per cent, reaching a value of €9 billion. Apart from trade 
relations, the UK’s net contribution to the EU is estimated to be around 
€13.5 billion. In this respect, a Brexit would reduce the EU budget, 
making it likely Italy will need to pay more. A British exit from the EU 
and a possible limitation for European migrants to move and work in the 
UK would therefore have devastating social and economic 
consequences for Italy. According to the Office for National Statistics, in 
2014 150,000 Italians lived in the UK. In 2015, 57,600 Italians registered
for UK national insurance numbers, which was 37 per cent more than in 
2014.
Given the potentially detrimental political and economic consequences 
of a Brexit, the Italian government has supported a middle ground 
solution, whereby the EU would allow the UK some reforms. However, 
Italian endorsement of British requests for a renegotiated membership 
have been quite generic. In particular, Prime Minister Renzi backs 
Cameron in the need for a less bureaucratic and more democratic 
Europe, one that fosters economic growth through effective free 
competition and employment. Yet, there are areas where Italy is not 
willing to compromise.
Above all, Italy will not validate the revision of the EU’s guiding principle 
of ‘ever closer union’, Moreover, Italy believes in the need to foster a 
stronger economic and monetary union together with the 
implementation of a common foreign and security strategy to face 
external threats such as the migration crisis. Therefore, while the Italian 
Prime Minister has maintained that there cannot be an EU without the 
UK, it is hard to see how he will endorse Cameron’s requests. His 
hopes for more political and economic integration make the Italian 
position towards the EU quite far from the British one.
Eleonora Poli – Instituto Affari Internazionali
Dr Eleonora Poli is a researcher at the Instituto Affari Internazionali in 
Rome.
_________________________________
Latvia: National security, not EU reform, is the 
priority
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Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, which started in 
February 2014, has changed the geopolitical perspective 
for Latvia. It has become far more difficult in Latvia to criticise the 
European Union and NATO membership with a resurgent Russia flexing 
its military muscle in the country’s neighbourhood. The idea of leaving 
the EU or the necessity of fundamentally reorganising the Union is not 
on the agenda for the political elite of Latvia.
The securitisation of EU membership has led to the further 
marginalisation of Eurosceptic organisations in Latvia. According to a 
2014 Eurobarometer poll, 57 per cent disagree that Latvia could better 
face the future outside of the EU. Compared to other countries, Latvia is 
in the middle of EU opinion, while the United Kingdom, with only 36 per 
cent disagreeing, is last among EU member states. In Latvia, the EU is 
perceived as one of the pillars for national security. The UK’s attempts 
at a renegotiation and the forthcoming referendum therefore do not 
resonate with policy makers or the majority of Latvian society.
It should therefore come as no surprise that the issues on Prime 
Minister David Cameron’s agenda are not on the agenda of politicians in 
Latvia. In May 2015 Cameron visited Riga for the Eastern Partnership 
summit. This was his first face-to-face meeting with the EU’s leaders 
after his victory in the May 2015 UK elections. The focus of the summit 
was on the EU’s relations with Eastern Partnership countries, however 
Cameron’s goal for the meeting was to press his case for EU reform 
and renegotiation. During the conference, and in the Prime Minister’s 
press conference following the summit, Cameron spoke about Britain’s 
unhappiness with the status quo, of “burdensome EU rules,” the 
problems of immigration, and the necessity for EU reform. His agenda 
was not welcomed.
In a bilateral meeting with Cameron, the Prime Minister of Latvia 
Laimdota Straujuma suggested that these topics were not welcome 
ones for discussion in Riga. Afterwards, Cameron himself reflected that 
he was “not met by a wall of love” at the summit. During and after the 
summit, his statements left no visible impact in the domestic political 
debates in Latvia. The securitisation of EU membership has led to a 
lack of meaningful debate in Latvia about the necessity of reforming the 
Union. It is hard to criticise something your national security depends on 
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and this was reflected by the lack of support given to the issues raised 
by David Cameron.
Little has changed since the meeting in May. Most of the 
aforementioned issues pursued by the UK are still not on Latvia’s 
political agenda. Immigration is on the agenda, but this has nothing to 
do with the UK. The necessity for EU member states to accept their 
share of asylum seekers has pushed the issue of immigration onto the 
political elite and society of Latvia.
The government of Latvia follows the developments of the possible UK 
exit and renegotiation, hoping the UK and EU will come to an 
understanding. Changes in the core values of the EU, such as 
limitations on the free movement of persons, goods and services, would 
not be welcome in Latvia. However, there are no serious debates on the 
need for reform of the EU, the necessity to simplify EU regulations or 
other similar issues. These are not priorities for Latvia; national security 
is.
Mārtinš Hiršs – University of Latvia
Mārtinš Hiršs is a Research Fellow at the Center for Security and 
Strategic Research in Latvia and a PhD student at the University of 
Latvia.
_________________________________
Lithuania: Britain is threatening the EU’s fundamental principles 
Britain’s attempt to renegotiate its relationship with the 
EU by dropping the commitment to an “ever closer 
union” and asking for opt-outs in specific areas of EU 
policies related to migration policy, welfare and 
competitiveness have raised serious concerns in 
Lithuania about the future integration of the EU. Some of the changes 
that David Cameron is seeking may significantly affect the functioning of 
the single market and the upholding of its core principles.
Britain’s attempt to renegotiate its EU membership has not gone 
unnoticed in Lithuania, which like other EU member countries has 
expressed criticism of Britain’s demands to opt out of some EU 
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employment legislation. Commenting on Britain’s demands, the 
president of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaitė has repeatedly underlined 
that no decisions can be made that undermine the fundamental values 
of the EU. For Grybauskaitė and the Lithuanian Government, the EU 
should adapt to a changing socioeconomic environment, but the Union’s 
core principles and values should be maintained. All of Britain’s 
attempts to renegotiate its membership in the EU should therefore be 
discussed with this in mind.
One of the renegotiation points raised by David Cameron has been a 
proposal to tighten migration policy to the UK by restricting access for 
EU nationals to in-work benefits and setting a four year residency test. 
The proposed amendments would create additional obstacles to the 
free movement of workers, meaning new migrants would have to wait 
for four years in order to access certain benefits such as tax credits or 
child benefit. Such a decision would significantly affect the citizens of 
EU Member States in Eastern Europe, including Lithuania and other 
Baltic states.
The UK, together with Germany and the Nordic countries, is among the 
top destinations for emigrating Lithuanians. According to the 2011 
census for England and Wales, around 100,000 Lithuanians reside in 
England and more arrive each year. The Lithuanian president 
underlined that all EU citizens should be given the right to work and 
move freely around the EU, which is one of the fundamental principles 
of the EU’s single market. Freedom of movement for workers, goods, 
services and capital are key to a fully functioning single market.
Grybauskaitė has also stressed many times that a fully integrated EU is 
more useful for Lithuania than a fragmented one. As one of the largest 
EU members, Britain plays a crucial role in preserving the Union’s unity 
and competitiveness. Therefore, from a Lithuanian perspective, 
reducing further the number of areas in which Britain is a fully engaged 
EU member could pose a threat to the fundamental principles of the 
Union.
Živilė Vaicekauskaite – Institute of International Relations and Political 
Science, Vilnius University
Živilė Vaicekauskaite is based at the Institute of International Relations 
and Political Science in Vilnius University.
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___________________________________
Luxembourg: There is no enthusiasm in 
Luxembourg for treaty change
Luxembourg, which holds the EU Council Presidency 
until the end of 2015, has proclaimed that it will count its 
12
th
 EU Presidency a success if it manages to steer the UK towards 
staying a member of the EU. The UK demands for a renegotiation 
represent, along with the Greek and refugee crises, an additional 
burden to the successful management of this Presidency for such a 
small country. However, it also places Luxembourg at the frontline of the 
negotiations, giving it the opportunity to show that its famous negotiation 
skills were not just due to former Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, 
but are a systemic feature of the Luxembourg governmental culture.
For the Luxembourg government, it is clear that the UK should stay in 
the EU. The Luxembourg government has stated that, “Keeping the UK 
in the EU is of strategic importance.” With the UK a big contributor to the 
EU budget, a Brexit would mean an increase in Luxembourg’s 
contributions. Furthermore, the EU would lose some of its clout in 
international affairs, which Luxembourg regards as highly detrimental.
The public discussions over a Brexit naturally focus on the impact on 
the Luxembourg banking industry, as the ties between the two countries 
are especially close in this domain. The President of the Luxembourg 
Banker’s Association has stated that Luxembourg would lose a close 
ally in EU negotiations concerning financial markets and taxation.
On the other hand, a study by the Bertelsmann Foundation found that 
Luxembourg might actually benefit from a Brexit, as some hedge funds 
might relocate from the UK to Luxembourg in order to stay in the 
European market (although these speculations may have been 
overstated). Luxembourg has no Eurosceptic parties to speak of; 
therefore the debate is framed mostly in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. 
Britain’s demands for reform have not triggered any kind of debate in 
Luxembourg on reform of the EU. Instead, the British are seen as 
eccentrics who constantly want to change the rules of the game.
Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister, Jean Asselborn, has acknowledged that 
some reforms to improve the functioning of the EU could be possible, 
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but without giving any details. Luxembourg is usually open to free trade, 
so it is in favour of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
and other trade deals. The Luxembourg government has openly 
rejected any treaty change, saying it would open a Pandora’s box. If 
treaty changes were on the table, other countries would raise their 
particular demands and, according to Asselborn, “the EU would die”.
This means the founding principles of the EU, such as free movement of 
people, should not be touched. Luxembourg counts on Germany and 
France to stay united on the point of treaty change, these countries 
being its natural and strongest allies. The Luxembourg government has 
supported an enhanced role for national parliaments in EU decision 
making. However, it has not made any official comments on the UK’s 
demand for an opt-out from ‘ever closer union’ or to changes to in-work 
benefits for EU migrants in the UK. It may be possible that these 
demands would not pose the greatest problems, but the devil is in the 
details. Any proposal that implies a treaty change is unlikely to be met 
with enthusiasm.
Martine Huberty
Dr Martine Huberty is coordinator of the International Association for the 
Study of German Politics.
_________________________________
Malta: Should Brexit materialise, UK influence in 
Malta is likely to diminish
The possibility of a Brexit does not make waves in Malta. 
This is extraordinary for an island that boasts long-
standing historic ties with Britain and which since joining the EU in 2004 
has struck a strong working relationship with the country. Since the 
2015 UK election, Brexit has featured prominently in the Maltese print 
media, but more so in the English than in the Maltese language 
publications. Since the UK’s top newspapers easily top the league of 
foreign papers sold in Malta, Brexit is known in the ‘Maltese street’. 
However, Maltese opinion leaders have not really picked up on the 
issue.
This does not mean that no one cares about Brexit. The ties uniting the 
two countries make it impossible to ignore. But missing is the more 
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serious discussion of what the implications of a Brexit will mean for 
Europe and for Britain itself. Furthermore, at the time of writing I could 
not trace any local public opinion polls on the issue, least of all on how 
the local British expatriates perceive Brexit.
Just under half a million UK citizens visited Malta in 2014, out of a total 
of 1.7 million tourists. Maltese, Cypriot and Irish citizens residing in the 
UK are the only foreigners who will be allowed to vote in the EU 
referendum. But this privilege has passed largely unnoticed in Malta. 
The 2011 population census showed that 6,652 out of 20,289 non-
Maltese residents in Malta (population 420,000) held a UK passport, 
thus constituting by far the largest group of non-Maltese residents on 
the island.
But typically they tend to keep a low profile and their presence has not 
led to loud public debates on how they are likely to be affected should 
Britain decide to leave the EU or what they actually think about it. The 
loss of EU citizenship may see some of their privileges pruned, such as 
the right to vote in European Parliament elections, but in all else they 
are unlikely to lose much, certainly not to the extent of being forced to 
leave. Some might also lose their work permit but all this depends on 
what kind of exit agreement (if we reach that point) is negotiated 
between the EU and the UK, if at all.
What has raised some speculation is whether the referendum might 
impact Malta’s turn at the helm of the Council of the EU Presidency, 
which is scheduled for the first half of 2017. Foreign Minister George 
Vella was reported to have said that while relations between Malta and 
the UK are expected to continue to prosper, the referendum could have 
some impact on Malta’s EU presidency.
The UK’s turn at the EU Council Presidency begins immediately after 
Malta’s. “We have already raised this possibility with our UK 
counterparts and I hope this does not mean we will have to remain at 
the helm of the EU for a whole year instead of six months,” Dr Vella said 
jokingly. He added: “Our counterparts have told us that by the time we 
will be occupying the presidency, the issue of whether the UK should 
still be part or not of the EU would have been settled.”
In June 2015 Prime Minister Cameron sounded out his Maltese 
counterpart Joseph Muscat on the possibility of EU treaty changes. But 
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Muscat made it clear that he would not accept treaty reforms by 
“stealth”. Dr Muscat was reported to have also insisted that there should 
be no changes on taxation and benefits unless there is agreement on 
treaty amendments. Malta is extremely sensitive to any expansion of the 
EU’s powers in the realm of taxation which could somehow jeopardise 
its lenient tax regime in the flourishing financial services, ship 
registration and gaming sectors.
The UK and Malta have developed links across the board, particularly in 
education and health services. British universities are still the most 
popular among Maltese students seeking further education abroad and 
a Brexit might well affect them should the reduced tuition fees enjoyed 
by EU citizens be discontinued. In the health sector, reciprocal 
agreements ensure that some categories of patients for whom treatment 
is unavailable in Malta are sent to the UK while UK citizens in Malta 
have access to the NHS.
Malta forms part of the Commonwealth, which not only strengthens its 
links with the UK, but also with countries such as Australia and Canada 
where there are sizable Maltese migrant communities. But the 
Commonwealth is not perceived as a substitute for EU membership 
while should Brexit materialise, UK influence in Malta is likely to 
diminish.
Roderick Pace – University of Malta 
Professor Roderick Pace holds a Jean Monnet Chair and is Director of 
at the Institute for European Studies, University of Malta.
_________________________________
The Netherlands: There is support for the UK’s 
renegotiation, but only up to a point 
The Hague has a strong economic and political interest 
to keep the UK in the EU. The Dutch government also 
shares several of Downing Street’s concerns about the functioning of 
the EU. It will therefore work with London in the renegotiation, but only 
up to a point.
While serving as minister of foreign affairs, Frans Timmermans outlined 
a number of EU reform ideas that have since become part of the 
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Juncker Commission’s agenda and David Cameron’s renegotiation 
wish-list. These include a stronger role for national parliaments in EU 
decision-making (e.g. yellow and red cards), better regulation, and a 
deeper single market with less red tape for businesses. Despite 
Timmermans’ move to the Commission in late 2014, the Dutch position 
has remained the same, and David Cameron will continue to find The 
Hague by his side on these issues.
Even in the controversial area of reducing the access to benefits of EU 
migrants, Cameron may find some support from the Dutch. The Dutch 
government is concerned about ‘benefit tourism’ and EU migrants 
undercutting local wages. But the issue is less politically sensitive than 
in the UK, and The Hague will not support any steps that are 
discriminatory or that undermine the single market. A case in point is 
that, so far, in the context of the refugee crisis, the Netherlands has not 
called for a revision of Schengen or suggested reforms that would 
impact the freedom of movement.
There are more red lines, however. The Netherlands may go some way 
toward easing British concerns about the position of non-Eurozone 
countries, but it will stop short of agreeing to changes that could make 
Eurozone decision-making more complicated or less efficient.
A compromise on the notion of “ever closer union” is possible, but treaty 
change in general is out of the question. This would likely trigger a 
politically-sensitive EU referendum in the Netherlands. Even the 
promise of future treaty change could be problematic. In early 2016, the 
Netherlands will hold a non-binding referendum on the EU’s association 
agreement with Ukraine, which could further fuel Dutch Eurosceptic 
sentiment.
So far, in the public domain, there has been little discussion about the 
renegotiation, and only some discussion about the impact of ‘Brexit’. 
Overall, a sense of complacency pervades; that, in the end, the British 
public will vote rationally and vote to stay in. At the level of European 
diplomacy, however, the Netherlands may feel it has a special role to 
play during the renegotiation. Not only because of key positions held by 
Dutchmen in Brussels, such as Commissioner Timmermans, Secretary-
General of the Council Alexander Italianer, or Jeroen Dijsselbloem, 
President of the Eurogroup.
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Personally, Cameron and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte get along 
well, and come from similar political backgrounds. And importantly, 
there is a belief in Dutch diplomatic circles that the Netherlands can 
build bridges (and reach compromises) between its two important 
neighbours, the UK and Germany. The renegotiation would surely be a 
moment to prove this.
Finally, the Netherlands will hold the Council presidency in early 2016. 
Although this means that it will have to play a more neutral role from 1 
January 2016 onwards, the presidency could overlap with the UK’s 
referendum vote and a potentially controversial post-referendum 
aftermath. Taken together, this means that for Cameron the Dutch will 
never be far away.
Rem Korteweg – Centre for European Reform
Dr Rem Korteweg is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for 
European Reform in London.
_________________________________
Poland: Warsaw’s stance will remain uncertain until 
after the October elections
Poles will vote in parliamentary elections on 25 October. 
The Civic Platform party has been in a governing 
coalition with the Polish Peasant Party for the last eight years. But 
according to opinion polls it looks set to lose to the right-wing Law and 
Justice party. The priority for Ewa Kopacz, the Polish prime minister is 
to improve her own ratings in the eyes of Polish citizens and so she has 
little time to contemplate Cameron’s reform plans. But this leaves the 
British prime minister with a great deal of uncertainty about Warsaw’s 
stance on his ideas for reform and complicates his plans to reach a deal 
with his European partners by the end of December. So what will 
Warsaw’s position be on central issues in Cameron’s renegotiation?
Whoever wins in October there would certainly be support for 
Cameron’s first reform area: making the EU more competitive by cutting 
red tape and further liberalising the single market. Poland is a clear 
beneficiary of the single market. Between 2004 and 2013 its exports to 
the rest of the EU grew almost three-fold, to reach a value of €114 
billion in 2013. But Law and Justice’s sympathy for deregulation does 
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not mean the party believes in Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ in all 
circumstances. On the contrary, it has promised to tax large retailers, 
many of which are foreign owned. But the party thinks that the EU’s 
institutions have interfered too much in citizens’ lives and hopes that 
Cameron’s ideas could help tame the Commission’s zeal.
Second, if Cameron’s aim to allow the UK to opt-out from ‘ever closer 
union’ were to trigger treaty change then he may find a more 
sympathetic ally in Law and Justice than in Civic Platform. But the risk is 
that Law and Justice may use discussions on ‘ever closer union’ to 
argue for its own opt-outs. Its representatives have already hinted they 
would attempt to secure exemptions from the EU’s climate policy. If the 
party decides to use Cameron’s reform agenda to unpick what it does 
not like about EU then other European capitals may follow suit, delaying 
the renegotiation process.
Third, Cameron wants national parliaments to have a greater say in EU 
decision-making. Both parties are ready to compromise in this 
renegotiation area. They might agree to a strengthening of the ‘yellow 
card‘ procedure, but a fear of EU institutional gridlock means they would 
both stop short of collective veto rights for national parliaments.
Fourth, the two parties are likely to have completely different views on 
Cameron’s fairness agenda. The British prime minister worries that 
deeper Eurozone integration could damage the integrity of the single 
market and Britain’s interests. He wants therefore to obtain some 
safeguards for euro-outs. The current Polish government has been 
more interested in participating in Eurozone deliberations and its 
decision-making than in securing safeguards for countries outside the 
euro area. This is because Civic Platform wants Poland to adopt the 
euro once the economic turmoil in the Eurozone is over. In contrast, 
Law and Justice’s prime ministerial candidate Beata Szydło has 
indicated that she would put off any discussion about Poland’s euro 
membership until the wages of Poles were similar to those of their 
Western European colleagues. Her mistrust of the euro makes her a 
natural ally of Cameron’s.
Finally, both parties will oppose Conservative attempts to limit access to 
unemployment and in-work benefits if this discriminates against EU 
citizens. Poles are the largest group of EU migrants living in the UK 
(Poles constituted 8.7 per cent of all foreign citizens in Britain in 2013) 
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and they are eligible to vote in Poland’s parliamentary elections. Neither 
Law and Justice nor Civic Platform will risk losing these votes by striking 
too submissive a tone to British demands.
But Warsaw’s opposition to Cameron’s anti-immigration rhetoric is not 
merely a political calculation. Cameron should realise that Poles see 
free movement of people as one of Europe’s greatest achievements, not 
a problem. The country was separated from Western Europe by the Iron 
Curtain for too long to sympathise with ideas that put freedom of 
movement at risk. If Cameron, on the other hand, can focus on 
improving the EU for everyone, whether in Western or Central Europe, 
he may be able to get the support he needs from Warsaw, no matter 
which party forms the next government.
Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska – Centre for European Reform
Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska is a Research fellow at the Centre for 
European Reform, London. An earlier version of this comment was 
published by the Centre for European Reform and on the Huffington 
Post blog.
_________________________________
Portugal: Lisbon’s general attitude has been fairly positive to the 
renegotiation, but without support for Treaty changes
The UK’s attempt to renegotiate its relationship with the 
EU has not been the focus of much public discussion in 
Portugal so far. The national media has covered the 
issue episodically and opinion leaders have written 
about it in the main Portuguese newspapers, but no 
major event has been organised publically to discuss the topic up to 
now and Portuguese decision-makers have even tended to downplay it 
when speaking in public.
A first possible explanation for this state of affairs is the fact that the 
UK’s renegotiation demands have thus far lacked detail, therefore 
foreclosing the possibility of any serious debate. The “British question” 
has also been overshadowed by a series of other more pressing issues, 
such as the Eurozone and Greek crises, the situation in Ukraine, 
international terrorism, the refugee crisis, together with Portugal’s own 
economic troubles and its general election, which took place in early 
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October. But there are also subtler reasons related to Portugal’s political 
and strategic culture, which mean that this kind of discussion is normally 
confined to a narrow circle of experts or conducted behind the scenes.
While public discussion on the issue has been limited, there is an acute 
awareness among Portuguese decision-makers of the serious 
implications that the British renegotiation could have, particularly if its 
leads to a “Brexit”. A British withdrawal from the Union is commonly 
perceived in Lisbon as a source of fragmentation and potential instability 
in Europe, as well as the loss of an old ally and important partner within 
the EU framework. While Portugal has had a more integrationist 
approach than the UK (Portugal is part of the euro and Schengen 
areas), both countries share an outward-looking and Atlanticist view of 
the world. Thus, Portugal strongly favours the UK remaining in the EU, 
but not at any cost.
When the British Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, visited Lisbon in 
February 2015 for initial talks about reforming the EU, his Portuguese 
counterpart, Minister Rui Machete, expressed openness toward the 
UK’s position, but also stated that changes in EU treaties were “not 
opportune”. Moreover, similar to many other Member States, Portugal 
has early on in discussions been very explicit in presenting free 
movement for EU citizens as one of its “red lines”, both as a matter of 
principle and particularly in view of the large Portuguese community 
living in other EU countries, not least in the UK.
As regards the other reforms sought by the UK government, Lisbon’s 
general attitude has been fairly positive, which in part is a reflection of 
the vagueness of David Cameron’s demands. Thus, Portugal clearly 
favours deepening the Single Market (for services, energy and the 
digital sector), limiting unnecessary regulation at the European level, 
and pursuing an ambitious trade agenda (with the United States, 
Canada, China and Japan). It also supports a greater role for national 
parliaments (which is consensual among most Member States, 
depending on details) and appears to have some openness on changes 
to in-work benefits for EU migrants in Britain, since this is perceived as 
being more of an internal issue.
While backing greater integration in the euro area, Portugal’s stance 
seems also to exhibit some sympathy toward the position of non-
Eurozone members. Indeed, the country’s contribution to the discussion 
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on Economic and Monetary Union governance that took place at the 
June 2015 European Council meeting expressly stated that “the reform 
of the euro area’s architecture should bridge the institutional divide 
between the euro area and the rest of the Union”. Finally, the demand 
for an opt-out from “ever closer union” is met with some puzzlement and 
neglect in Lisbon, since it is seen as mainly symbolic and intrinsic to 
Britain’s domestic debate.
Up until now, the British renegotiation has had no major impact on 
Portugal’s own internal debate about the EU. In recent years the 
national mood towards the Union has become more critical, but this 
evolution is more directly linked to the austerity measures implemented 
under the Troika. Moreover, Eurosceptic political forces in the country 
have remained marginal.
To illustrate, the “British question” did not figure in the context of the 
recent parliamentary election, which was won by the ruling right-wing 
PSD/CDS coalition, led by the pro-European Pedro Passos Coelho, 
though without an absolute majority. This inconclusive election will entail 
more negotiation and compromise between the coalition and the 
opposition, but as the latter is led by the also pro-European centre-left 
Socialist Party (PS) few changes are expected in Portugal’s stance 
towards the UK’s renegotiation in the near future.
António Raimundo – University of Minho
António Raimundo is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of 
Minho, Portugal and an Assistant Professor at ISCTE-University 
Institute of Lisbon, Portugal.
_________________________________
Romania: There is staunch opposition to restrictions 
on the free movement of people
Over the past year, political and public debates in 
Romania’s mass-media on the UK’s renegotiation 
demands have focused mostly on the potential impact on the 
fundamental liberties secured by the EU’s treaties. Particular attention 
has been paid to the freedom of movement across the EU as a right 
which should not be overlooked or restricted in any way. This is 
regardless of the various reasons, with UK debates and fears about 
Page 40 of 49EUROPP – Cameron’s letter: European views on the UK’s renegotiation
12/11/2015http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/11/10/camerons-letter-european-view...
Romanian and Bulgarian workers moving to the UK in search of work 
being replaced over recent months by security concerns stemming from 
the Syrian refugee influx towards western and northern Europe.
Except for a few specific topics, the Romanian public and authorities 
oppose Westminster’s declared intentions to renegotiate more opt-out 
clauses from EU treaties. The UK’s renegotiation plans are viewed as 
another challenge to be overcome or dealt with by Romania, which, 
having joined the EU in 2007, is still working to secure the economic 
and political benefits of EU membership. Any attempts aimed at 
institutionalising national-driven, inward looking policies, regardless of 
their source or nature, are seen as a direct threat to the difficult 
progress Romania has made in connecting to the rest of the EU.
Similar opposition is shown to UK attempts to obtain further opt-outs 
from the economic and monetary dimensions of the Union, a position 
which stems from Romania’s public support for the adoption of the euro 
(although Romania is still far from meeting the targets required for 
formal adoption of the single currency). The only reforms the UK has 
been pushing that Bucharest favours are an enhanced role for national 
parliaments and a more economically dynamic and outward looking EU. 
In relation to the latter, Romania advocates an economic 
rapprochement to countries in the Middle East and particularly with 
resource-rich Central Asia.
It should therefore come as no surprise that there is an explicit 
opposition to any future changes to in-work benefits for EU workers in 
the UK. The Romanian press has extensively quoted sources in the 
German press covering Chancellor Merkel’s statements that a UK exit 
from the EU would be preferable to limitations of the right to free 
movement across the Union. This opinion is one strongly shared by the 
Romanian authorities and has been made clear in various statements
and positions, though with nuances (for instance, while the support 
expressed for an unlimited freedom of movement was unequivocal, 
there was a focus on a responsible conduct in destination countries, in 
all forms – in the context of the controversies in the UK about potential 
abuse of social assistance systems by Romanians moving to Britain).
The UK’s intention to limit the number of unqualified workers going to 
the UK in search of work is not favoured by the Romanian public and 
authorities, with statements to this effect being made both domestically 
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and at EU level. Romania looks set to team up with Poland, Bulgaria 
and the Baltic states in opposing any UK push to restrict the right of free 
movement and more specifically, workers’ rights across the EU.
Agnes Nicolescu – Aspen Institute Romania
Agnes Nicolescu is Public Policy Director at the Aspen Institute 
Romania. Opinions expressed here are personal and do not represent 
those of the Aspen Institute.
_________________________________
Slovenia: The government believes the EU’s four 
freedoms should remain the basis for any change
There have been a number of meetings between the UK 
and Slovene governments during which the UK’s 
concern and renegotiation have been raised. In spring 2014, Slovenian 
Prime Minister Alenka Bratušek (of the centre-left “Positive Slovenia” 
party) visited London to host an investors’ conference and meet with 
British Prime Minister David Cameron.
Bratušek’s government, facing public finance pressures in the context of 
the Eurozone crisis, was pursuing pragmatic economic and European 
policies which had brought it closer to the UK’s views. During a short 
meeting Bratušek and Cameron discussed a range of issues including 
the forthcoming European Parliament elections and the future of the EU, 
but no details of their discussions were revealed.
In February 2015, British Foreign Minister Philip Hammond paid a visit 
to Slovenia to present the UK’s position on EU reform. Focusing on 
economic aspects such as employment and growth, Hammond, in his 
own words, found there was lots of agreement on these issues between 
the two countries. However, a key issue for the UK about limitations of 
social rights for other EU member state citizens in the UK was the one 
picked up on by the Slovene media. The media reported that Germany 
in principle sympathised with some elements of the UK’s proposal, but 
that Poland was insisting that Cameron would not get far on the issue.
Other issues pushed by the UK, such as competitiveness of the internal 
market, the powers Brussels has over national parliaments and the 
unequal position of non-euro members were reported to be less 
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problematic or less defined. The new Slovene government coalition, 
which took power in September 2014 under the leadership of Miro Cerar 
(of the centre-left “Modern Centre Party”), has not yet made clear any 
positions on the UK’s proposals. According to the Slovene daily Delo, 
government representatives, however, have said that a “strong EU is 
needed which needs a strong UK”. This echoed the words Angela 
Merkel used one year before during her visit to London.
Following Cameron’s victory at the UK elections, the Slovene media 
focused on his promise to hold a referendum. The possible secession of 
Scotland was discussed in case voters in the rest of the UK voted to 
leave. The media argued that a Brexit could harm Slovene firms working 
for major EU car manufacturers, for which the UK is an important 
market. However, Brexit is still considered to be a more costly 
development for the UK. Slovene media have quoted a study by the 
Bertelsmann institute according to which the costs of a Brexit for the UK 
were estimated at €300 billion.
Cameron’s June 2015 EU tour included a stop in Slovenia. This was the 
first visit of any UK Prime Minister to Slovenia since its independence in 
1991. Prime Minister Cerar said he appreciated Cameron’s decision to 
visit smaller EU members. This contrasted with the ignorance shown 
toward smaller members during negotiations on the Greek bailout that 
took place on the margins of the EU Summit in Riga one month before.
In Cerar’s view, it was Cameron’s party that was pressuring him to hold 
a referendum and to impose tougher rules on EU migrants to the UK. 
He said Slovenia was ready to listen to Britain’s ideas and consider 
them thoroughly in the coming months. Cerar, however, also said 
Slovenia “wants a successful EU that is connected in vital areas”. In his 
view the EU’s four freedoms should remain the basis for any change.
The Slovene media have reported that in other EU capitals there is a 
growing sentiment against the type of changes to the Lisbon Treaty that 
would be required to satisfy the UK’s demands. On the centre-right, 
Cameron’s visit did lead to arguments that if as much attention was paid 
to the UK’s views as to keeping Greece in the Eurozone, then the EU’s 
competitiveness problems would be long gone. However, Slovenia lacks 
a modern Eurosceptic party that questions Slovene EU membership.
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Marko Lovec – University of Ljubljana
Dr Marko Lovec is a research fellow at the International Relations 
Research Centre at the University of Ljubljana.
_________________________________
Spain: A Flexible but Europeanist Response
Europeanism still defines Spaniards’ attitudes on foreign 
policy. Unlike other EU countries, no Eurosceptic parties 
have emerged during the harsh years of the economic 
and financial crisis, nor have the main political parties or 
other social organizations developed any anti-European 
discourse. That is to say that Spain and Britain can be understood as 
two diverging visions about the future of European integration and their 
roles within it. However, the Spanish government defends a flexible 
response towards Britain’s intentions to renegotiate its EU membership, 
as long as it does not affect the DNA of the EU.
Mariano Rajoy’s government was missing in the Brexit debate until 
David Cameron started his second tour around European capitals in 
early September. In a joint press briefing in the Moncloa Palace, Rajoy 
clearly called for the UK to remain in the EU and supported the pro-free 
trade and liberalising agenda proposed by Cameron, without expressing 
any public disclaim on the restrictive proposals for EU migrants in the 
UK. Moreover, Spain’s first symptoms of economic recovery and 
Catalan calls for independence are still overshadowing any public 
address on the EU agenda made by the Spanish government, 
preventing it from being a proactive partner within the EU.
The European Council on Foreign Relations has already identified the 
main red lines for Spain and other member states in the British attempt 
to renegotiate its EU membership. Being both Conservative, Spain and 
Britain share similar interests in enhancing the single market, cutting red 
tape for small businesses and being supportive of TTIP negotiations. 
However, the Spanish government cannot cope with any proposal 
whose goal would be to limit the freedom of movement in the EU or 
would directly restrict social benefits to Spanish migrants in that country. 
Considering that Spaniards were the third top nationality for National 
Insurance Number Registrations in 2014 but also that over a million 
British people live regularly in Spain, it is just common sense to find any 
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element of reciprocity between both countries in dealing with access to 
the benefit system for EU citizens.
As far as the question of treaty change is concerned, there is no public 
discussion in Spain. The main Spanish political parties agree that, in the 
current context, any intergovernmental negotiation among 28 member 
states would be like opening Pandora’s Box. If Britain needs more opt-
outs in order to remain in the EU, Spain will have enough flexibility to 
accept it, and even push for it. Madrid will never defend a “Europe à la 
carte” strategy for itself, but admits that differentiated integration may 
allow enhanced integration for those countries who really want it.
Are we facing a battle of ideas between a German Europe project and a 
British Europe one? If so, Spain will definitely remain closer to German 
ideas of ‘more Europe’ rather than British proposals of ‘less Europe’. 
Furthermore, as general elections in Spain are scheduled for mid-
December, the party in government is keen to present its leader, 
Mariano Rajoy, as the closest and most reliable partner of Angela 
Merkel. Following these elements, we can even predict that if Britain 
and Germany agree on the agenda for the new UK-EU relations, Spain 
will easily support the agreement for a ‘better Europe’ for all.
Laia Mestres – IBEI
Laia Mestres is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Institut Barcelona 
d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). 
_________________________________
Sweden: Both risks and opportunities in EU renegotiation 
Sweden has a strong political and economic interest in 
ensuring that the UK remains firmly in the EU. Both 
countries are close partners in Europe, sharing common 
positions on various issues (such as free trade, 
competitiveness and fiscal discipline) as well as similar 
political outlooks. Sweden is therefore broadly sympathetic to London’s 
attempts to reform the EU, although with some notable caveats. 
Moreover, it’s clearly in Sweden’s interest to encourage the UK to 
negotiate constructively and to help Cameron obtain what he needs in 
order to keep the UK in the EU.
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Under the former Swedish center-right government, David Cameron 
enjoyed a close personal relationship to his Swedish counterpart, 
Fredrik Reinfelt, an ideological soul mate of sorts. Sweden’s Social 
Democratic Party, elected to government in 2014, has continued to 
pursue a close relationship with London. Illustrating the closeness 
between Sweden and the UK, Stockholm recently hosted George 
Osborne to discuss common perspectives on EU reform. So far, the 
new Swedish government has opted for a fairly low profile on this and 
other European issues—unlike its predecessor, which sought to play a 
key role in Brussels, spearheaded by its then-foreign minister Carl Bildt.
From a Swedish perspective, the UK’s reform efforts in the EU are at 
once an opportunity and a risk. On the one hand, Sweden shares 
Cameron’s desire for a more lean, effective and less bureaucratic EU 
where non-Eurozone states are not overrun. For example, Sweden 
would be in favor of less centralization of power in Brussels, better 
coexistence between the Single Market and an integrated Eurozone, 
and of giving national parliaments a bigger say over EU affairs. At the 
same time, Sweden sees some risks in the British renegotiation efforts. 
For example, any attempt to restrict freedom of movement or access to 
social benefits within the EU would be met by strong opposition from 
Stockholm.
It is worth noting that if Cameron succeeds in keeping the UK in the EU 
on terms that do not compromise the core principles of the EU, then 
Sweden would also likely want to make sure that it too could tap into 
any such deal. It is therefore in Sweden’s and other smaller EU states’ 
interest that the UK’s negotiations with the EU do not take place 
exclusively behind closed doors but in an open and transparent way.
While the idea of a Brexit has received some attention in Sweden’s 
domestic debate, local media has less extensively covered Cameron’s 
renegotiation efforts. A possible explanation for this is Sweden’s own 
current struggle with the refugee crisis—an issue that dominates the 
domestic debate and which is causing political uncertainty.
Like the rest of the EU, the Swedish government will make clear its 
specific positions on the UK’s renegotiation terms when the UK itself 
makes clear its demands. While generally sympathetic to London’s 
efforts to reform the EU, Stockholm is cautious against compromising 
on some of the Union’s core principles. That said, Sweden does not 
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want to see the UK leave the Union. It would lose an important and like-
minded ally. But how far Stockholm is willing to go to prevent such a 
scenario remains to be seen.
Erik Brattberg – McCain Institute, Washington D.C. 
Erik Brattberg is a senior fellow at the McCain Institute and a non-
resident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic relations at Johns Hopkins 
University SAIS in Washington, DC.
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